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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
Plaintiffs; Lane Swainston, Lori Swainston and Lane 
Swainston as guardian ad litem for Zachary Swainston, a minor. 
Defendants: Intermountain Health Care, Inc., dba Utah 
Valley Hospital, Steven S. MacArthur, M.D., Steven S. MacArthur, 
M.D., a professional corporation, and DOES I through X, 
inclusive. Of the defendants, only Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc. is a party to this appeal. 
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case in federal court under federal law. The district court 
certified its order as final and directed entry of the order 
pursuant to U.R.Civ.P. 54(b). (R. 336-41, Add. 1-6.) IHC filed 
both a final-order appeal and an interlocutory appeal, and the 
interlocutory appeal was granted. (R. 364, 606.) The appeals 
are now consolidated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 25, 1984, the Howard firm, through attorney 
Richard B. Johnson, entered its appearance of counsel for the 
plaintiffs in this case. (R. 39.) At that same time, the case 
of Wilson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., Civil No. 69908 
(filed June 14, 1985), was also pending in the Fourth District 
Court of Utah County. IHC was represented in Wilson by 
out-of-state counsel, Peter C. Rosenbloom. (I Tr. 7; Rosenbloom 
Affidavit, R. 111.) On July 11, 1985, Mr. Rosenbloom telephoned 
Richard B. Johnson to associate the Howard firm as local defense 
counsel for IHC in the Wilson case. Rosenbloom explained the 
nature of the Wilson case and identified each of the 
defendants, including IHC. Johnson agreed to associate the 
Howard firm as local defense counsel for IHC in the Wilson 
case. Johnson did not disclose to Rosenbloom that he and the 
Howard firm were at that time representing the plaintiffs 
against IHC in this case, as well as representing other 
plaintiffs against IHC in several other cases. (I Tr. 8-22, 
44-54, 64; Rosenbloom Affidavit, R. 111-12.) Johnson did not 
disclose the conflict of interest to either the plaintiffs in 
this case or IHC and failed to obtain the consent of either the 
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plaintiffs or IHC to engage in the conflicting representation. 
(I Tr. 61-63, 81, 99-101; II Tr. 5-11, 20, 27, 45-46; Gilson 
Affidavit, R. 108-09.) 
The Howard firm, through attorney Johnson, subsequently 
acted as local defense counsel for IHC in the Wilson case and 
was identified as such in documents filed in the Wilson case. 
(I Tr. 12; R. 113-14, 116, 134-35, 152.) IHC was billed for the 
Howard firm's services. (I Tr. 60-61; R. 115.) During their 
representation of IHC in the Wilson case, Johnson and the 
Howard firm acquired or had access to privileged or confidential 
information that may have been used or construed against the 
interest of IHC in this case and other cases against IHC. (II 
Tr. 21-24; Gilson Affidavit, R. 109; Answers to Interrogatories, 
R. 246-47.) The Howard firm withdrew from representing IHC in 
the Wilson case on January 16, 1986, but only after IHC 
discovered the conflicting representation and demanded its 
withdrawal. (II Tr. 5-11; I Tr. 60-63.) 
IHC subsequently filed motions to disqualify the Howard 
firm from representing the plaintiffs in the several cases that 
firm had pending against IHC during the dual representation. 
The first case in which the motion to disqualify was ruled upon 
was the federal court case of Bodily v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 468 (D. Utah 1986), an action for 
wrongful deprivation of medical staff privileges. In that case, 
U.S. District Judge J. Thomas Greene found that the Howard firm 
had violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 
but concluded that under federal law disqualification was not 
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required. (Id.; Bodily Memorandum Decision also attached as 
Exhibit "A" to state district court's Ruling, R. 342-63, Add. 
7-28.) 
In the interest of judicial economy, counsel for IHC and 
the Howard firm stipulated that the transcript and record 
relating to the disqualification motion in Bodily should be 
incorporated into this case to be relied upon by the state 
district court in ruling on the motion to disqualify under Utah 
law. However, instead of addressing the merits of the motion 
to disqualify, the district court merely incorporated the ruling 
of Judge Greene in Bodily, and held that adjudication of the 
motion to disqualify was barred by the collateral estoppel and 
full faith and credit doctrines. (Ruling, R. 336-41, Add. 1-6.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Underlying this appeal are serious violations of the Utah 
Code of Professional Responsibility that require 
disqualification of plaintiffs1 counsel under this Court's 
statement of Utah law in Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 
(Utah 1985). Collateral estoppel does not apply to bar 
adjudication of the disqualification motion because the issue on 
which preclusion is sought (1) is not identical to the issue 
decided in Bodily, and (2) was not decided in a final judgment 
on the merits. Adjudication of the motion is not barred by the 
full faith and credit doctrine because the Bodily order would 
not be given preclusive effect under federal law. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Howard firm's violations of the Utah Code of 
Professional responsibility are at least as serious and damaging 
as those found to require disqualification in Margulies v. 
Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985). For a period of over six 
months the Howard firm was acting as defense counsel for IHC in 
the Wilson case while simultaneously suing IHC in this case 
and several other cases throughout the state. The Howard firm 
engaged in this conflicting representation without the knowledge 
or consent of any of the parties involved. In addressing the 
disqualification motion in Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 649 F. Supp. 468 (D. Utah 1986), the federal court found 
a clear violation of the conflict-of-interest proscription 
embodied in Canon 5. Id at 475-76. In responding to the 
disqualification motion in this case, the Howard firm admitted 
that its conduct violated Canon 5. (R. 307.) 
Under this Court's analysis in Margulies, the Howard 
firm's conduct violated not only Canon 5, but Canon 9 as well, 
and mandates the sanction of disqualification. Speaking of 
Canon 5, this Court stated: 
At the very least, one has to wonder about the trust and 
confidence a [client] will be able to repose in an 
attorney whose partners and associates are suing him for 
professional malpractice. . . . Jones, Waldo's failure to 
comply with the standards set forth in Canon 5 may not 
be cured or rectified by an optional withdrawal in the 
case of its choice . . . . [696 P.2d at 1203-04.] 
An actual violation of the conflict-of-interest proscription 
involving clients on both sides of several different cases 
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throughout the state certainly gives an unmistakable "appearance 
of professional impropriety" in violation of Canon 9: 
The basis of this tenet is that society's perception of 
the integrity of our legal system may be as important as 
the reality, since it is the perception that engenders 
public confidence that justice will be dispensed. 
Litigants are highly unlikely to be able to maintain this 
confidence if their attorney in one matter is allowed 
simultaneously to sue them in another. [Id. at 1204.] 
This Court concluded in Margulies that where a serious 
appearance of impropriety is coupled with another violation of 
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the integrity of the 
court system and of the profession "requires" disqualification. 
Id. at 1205. 
Thus, the underlying disqualification motion is a matter 
of substantial importance, not only to the parties of this case, 
but to the legal profession and the entire justice system. The 
district court plainly erred in refusing to address the merits 
of the motion. 
II. IHC IS NOT COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED TO OBTAIN A DECISION ON 
THE MERITS OF THE DISQUALIFICATION MOTION IN THIS CASE. 
The district court denied the motion to disqualify 
primarily on the basis that IHC "is collaterally estopped to 
relitigate the same issue that was decided by Judge Greene in 
the case of Bodily v. IHC." (Add. 4.) However, a thorough 
analysis of the purpose and elements of collateral estoppel 
demonstrates that it has no application to this case. 
The purpose of collateral estoppel is to prevent 
relitigation of issues which a party has previously litigated, 
and thereby promote judicial economy. Penrod v. Nu Creation 
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Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 1983). This Court has 
developed four tests or elements to determine the applicability 
of collateral estoppel: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
identical with the one presented in the action in 
question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case competently, fully, 
and fairly litigated? 
Baxter v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 705 P.2d 1167, 1168 
(Utah 1985). All four elements must be satisfied for collateral 
estoppel to apply. Id. In this case, only the third element 
is satisfied, as IHC was a party to the Bodily case. If the 
fourth element is regarded as merely a due process protection, 
see Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah App. 1987), then 
it too was satisfied in Bodily. However, if it is viewed as 
an adjunct to the first element, see Schaer v. State, 657 
P.2d 1337, 1341 (Utah 1983), then it was not satisfied, as the 
following analysis demonstrates. 
A. Lack of Identity of Issues 
To satisfy the first element of collateral estoppel, the 
issue sought to be precluded must be "identical to," i.e., 
"precisely the same as" the issue adjudicated in the prior 
action. Wilde v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 635 P.2d 417, 419 
(Utah 1981). The precise issue adjudicated in Bodily was 
whether the Howard firm's conflicting concurrent representation 
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required disqualification under federal law. While lawyers 
practicing in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah 
are governed by both the state and national codes of 
professional responsibility, "the Utah Supreme Court's 
construction of Utah's version of the Code is [only] relevant 
and persuasive," not binding. Bodily, supra, 649 F. Supp. 
at 473 n.6. A motion to disqualify counsel filed in federal 
court ultimately "must be resolved by resort to federal law," 
McMahon v. Seitzinger Bros. Leasing, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 618, 
619 (D. Pa. 1981), rather than to rules of state courts, 
International Business Machines Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 
279 n.2 (3rd Cir. 1978). 
Accordingly, while the Bodily court cited Margulies 
in its analysis of the Howard firm's ethical violations, it is 
apparent that the Bodily court relied principally on federal 
case law, and in deciding whether to impose the sanction of 
disqualification relied entirely on federal law. Had Judge 
Greene followed Utah law as set forth in Margulies he would 
have ordered disqualification. Instead he relied on federal 
cases that require "a restrained approach" and impose 
disqualification only upon a showing of actual prejudice and 
tainted proceedings. Bodily, supra, at 477-78. By 
contrast, Margulies held that violations of Canons 5 and 9 
"may not be cured or rectified by an optional withdrawal in the 
case of [counsel's] choice." 696 P.2d at 1204. Rather, because 
"society's [including clients'] perception of the integrity of 
our legal system may be as important as the reality," id., 
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such violations "require" withdrawal from both actions, 
without a showing of actual taint or prejudice. _Id. at 1205. 
Thus, it is apparent that Judge Greene decided the 
disqualification motion in Bodily under federal law, as he was 
expected and required to do. The issue whether the Howard 
firm's conflicting concurrent representation requires 
disqualification under Utah law is raised for the first time 
in this case and is yet to be adjudicated. Because that issue 
is not "identical" to the issue decided in Bodily, collateral 
estoppel cannot apply. 
The case of Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 
596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979), supports the conclusion that 
litigation of a matter in federal court under federal law does 
not bar subsequent adjudication of the same matter in state 
court under state law. There, a corporation obtained a loan, 
pledging four automobiles as collateral. The Internal Revenue 
Service later seized the cars to satisfy the personal tax 
liability of the corporation's organizer. The corporation filed 
suit in federal court to recover the automobiles and in state 
court to enjoin foreclosure on the loan. The federal court 
ruled that the corporation was merely the organizer's alter ego 
and upheld the seizure. The lender in the state action then 
invoked collateral estoppel to prevent relitigation of the alter 
ego issue. However, this Court rejected application of 
collateral estoppel because the federal ruling was based on 
federal law and the lender's corporate-fiction defense in the 
state action was based on Utah law. Thus, while the objective 
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or desired result was the same in both actions, i.e., to pierce 
the corporate veil, the issues were sufficiently distinct to 
preclude application of collateral estoppel. 
See also Beckmann v. Beckmann, 685 P.2d 1045, 1050 
(Utah 1984) (bankruptcy court order discharging debts under 
federal law did not preclude state court adjudication on which 
debts were discharged under state law); Rhoades v. Wright, 622 
P.2d 343, 349-50 (Utah 1980) (Colorado court's dismissal of 
wrongful death action based on Colorado statute of limitations 
did not bar adjudication of the limitations issue in Utah under 
an identical Utah statute); Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, 
Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 558 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1977) 
(federal court determination of mall's status as public utility 
did not preclude adjudication of the issue by state PSC). 
In sum, the first element of collateral estoppel is not 
satisfied because the disqualification issue raised in this case 
is not identical to the issue decided by the federal court in 
Bodily. 
B. Absence of Final Judgment on the Merits 
For collateral estoppel to apply, the precluded issue 
must have been adjudicated in "a final judgment on the merits." 
Baxter, supra, 705 P.2d at 1168. Collateral estoppel may 
not be based on an interlocutory order. IB Moore's Federal 
Practice pp. 744-47 (2d ed. 1984). Finality for purposes of 
res judicata or collateral estoppel is measured by the same 
standard as for appealability. Gresham Park Community 
Organization v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1242 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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In Utah, "a judgment, to be final, must dispose of the case as 
to all the parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter of 
the litigation on the merits of the case." Kennedy v. New Era 
Industries, Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979). See also, 
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978)(same 
rule under federal law). Absent "finality" or certification of 
finality under Rule 54(b), the order "shall not terminate the 
action . . . [and] is subject to revision at any time before the 
entry of [final] judgment." U.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (identical to the 
federal rule). However, even a trial court certification of 
finality does not necessarily make an otherwise interlocutory 
order "final." Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 768 
(Utah 1984). 
Clearly, the Bodily order denying disqualification did 
not finally dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on 
the merits. The district court in this case characterized the 
Bodily order as "final" under the collateral order doctrine. 
(Add. 5.) However, the court is in error because the United 
States Supreme Court has expressly held that a federal court 
order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is not a final 
collateral order and "is not subject to appeal prior to 
resolution of the merits." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981). See also 
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Roller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) 
(federal court order granting disqualification motion is not a 
final collateral order). The fact that Judge Greene regarded 
his Bodily order as "final" does not make it so. See 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1957). 
Thus, the Bodily order is interlocutory in nature and remains 
subject to revision until entry of final judgment. Therefore, 
it may not serve as a basis for collateral estoppel on the 
disqualification issue. 
Finally, it should be noted that the purpose of 
collateral estoppel will not be defeated by a ruling on the 
merits of the disqualification motion in this case. To conserve 
the resources of the parties and the court, counsel stipulated 
that the transcript and relevant portions of the Bodily record 
could be incorporated into the record in this case. Thus, a 
decision on the merits of the disqualification motion in this 
case will not result in duplication of the Bodily adjudication. 
In sum, the necessary elements of collateral estoppel are 
not present in this case; therefore, the district court erred in 
applying collateral estoppel to deny the disqualification motion. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT IS NOT BARRED BY THE FULL FAITH AND 
CREDIT DOCTRINE FROM DECIDING THE DISQUALIFICATION MOTION. 
The district court also ruled that it was barred by the 
full faith and credit clause from deciding the disqualification 
motion. (Add. 4.) However, the full faith and credit 
provisions, U.S. Const., art. IV, §1 and 28 U.S.C. §1738, merely 
require a court to accord a prior judgment the same preclusive 
effect that it would have in the jurisdiction where it was 
rendered. E.g.. Braselton v. Clearfield State Bank, 606 
F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1979); Veiser v. Armstrong, 688 P.2d 796 
(Okla. 1984). 
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The federal court's order in Bodily would not be 
accorded collateral estoppel effect under federal law. Under 
federal law, the prerequisites for collateral estoppel are 
substantially the same as those outlined above from Utah cases. 
See IB Moore's Federal Practice U 0.441 (2d ed. 1984). 
There can be no preclusive effect under federal law because, as 
demonstrated above, the issues in the two cases are not the same 
and the Bodily order is not "final." Accordingly, the 
district court was not required to give full faith and credit to 
the Bodily order: 
There are many cases that have held that collateral 
estoppel, as an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, 
deals with the conclusive force of final judgments and 
therefore has no application until a final judgment is 
entered. This view is almost certainly correct in the 
context of full faith and credit, for as a general 
principle a court is not required to afford to the 
decision of another court more faith and credit than it 
is afforded by the court that rendered it. It follows 
that a decision that is interlocutory in the rendering 
court cannot command obedience in another court. [IB 
Moore's, supra, p. 745 footnotes omitted.] 
The few cases that could be found dealing specifically 
with a disqualification motion in the context of collateral 
estoppel confirm that, under federal law, rulings on such 
motions would not be given preclusive effect. In Hawkins v. 
Holiday Inns, Inc. , 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1163,311 (D. Tenn. 
1980), aff'd without opin., 652 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1981) (Add. 
29-31), the defendant moved to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel, 
and the plaintiffs argued that the issue was precluded by 
collateral estoppel because a motion by the same defendant to 
disqualify the same counsel in a different case had previously 
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been denied. The court rejected that argument, concluding that 
it was not bound by the determination in the other federal 
court. The court reasoned that collateral estoppel has no 
application to a motion to disqualify counsel because every 
court has the inherent right and duty to regulate the conduct of 
attorneys practicing before it. In view of the clear ethical 
violations, the court concluded that it "would be remiss in 
failing to disqualify [counsel]" solely because a different 
court in a different case did not consider disqualification 
necessary. The court added that if the challenged counsel 
thought collateral estoppel applicable, they should have moved 
to stay proceedings on the second motion instead of opting "to 
take two bites at the apple." See also Fisher Studio, Inc. v 
Loew's, Inc., 232 F.2d 199, 204 (2nd Cir. 1956). 
Similarly, in this case the district court erred in 
concluding that it had no discretion to address the motion 
simply because the Bodily court had denied a similar motion. 
The district court has the duty to regulate the conduct of 
counsel under Utah law and the discretion to order 
disqualification where appropriate. The full faith and credit 
clause does not demand that Utah courts and Utah law be 
subservient to federal courts and federal law. See Rhoades 
v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343, 351 (Utah 1980). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based » * •""• - foregoina ! h;U C nr 1 should reverse the 
order -*•* • , • - ^
 : - • • » na on 
tl'ie IT-- . qua lif ication motion 
DATED this / 7 ^ d a v of December 1987. 
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DISTRICT COURT -F UTAH COUNTY, 
S L- I 
LANE SWAINSTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
INTERMOUNTA IN HE A I TH C.A R E, 
( 
) Ci vil No. 66045 
( 
) RULING 
etal , J 
D e f endiimi s . * 
, 
Tl ii :: m a 1 1 e r co'oies b e f o r e t h e C o u r t , i incie i Ru 1 e 
2.8, on the motion of defendant, seeking an order dis-
qualifying plainti". •* ] , Howard, I .ewi s & Peter se .i i, 
from further representing plaintiffs i n this case. The 
Court has reviewed the fi 1 :••, considered the memoranda of 
CM in;-.* 1 #jni P ft * c.ur. ; PI ng 
advisee m trie premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
FINDINGS; 
1 The parties have entered into the following 
'stipulation: 
"Defendant Intermountain Health Care, Inc , dba Utah 
Valley Regional Medical Center hereinafter referred to ar 
n
 AHC") - - I, I ,ew i s 8 Peter sei i by and 
through their respective counsel, hereby stipulate as 
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follows: 
WHEREAS, IHC has filed a Motion to Disqualify with 
this Court, alleging a conflict of interest on the part 
of the law firm of Howard, Lewis & Petersen resulting from 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen's representation of IHC in Vada 
S. Wilson v. Intermountain Health Care, et al., Civil No. 
69908, an action filed and currently pending in the fourth 
Judicial District Court of Utah County; and 
WHEREAS, a similar motion was filed in the case of 
Norman Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care, et al., in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, 
Central Division; and 
WHEREAS, an evidentiary hearing was held on September 
29, 1986, before the Honorable J. Thomas Greene, on IHC's 
Motion to Disqualify pending before that Court, and a 
Memorandum Decision and Order was issued on November 25, 
1986, finding a violation of Canon V but denying the Motion 
to Disqualify; and 
WHEREAS, both IHC and Howard, Lewis & Petersen desire 
to resolve the current Motion to Disqualify before this 
Court in a timely and expeditious manner without resorting 
to a full evidentiary hearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IHC and Howard, Lewis & Petersen, by 
and through their counsel of record, hereby request oral 
-3 -
a r g u i i n ' i i l n IIK " " M n l i mi I I> i ' M | I M 1 I t'Y , H T M I . I ^ I * - T n n d 
stipulate as follows: 
formal evidentiary hearing, 
the "« : • .. - ±*: j*. 
v. IHC before Judge Greene max -.th the Court ? >ermission, 
•|)e r e i ± e Xli t|ie matter pending before this Court, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit ft ; 
2. That i f the "witnesses who testified before Judge 
Gre y M.-'T (•• c a l ] eci !:• :: testi f) :li i 1 tl: :d s matter tl: ley w :: • i 1] :i 
testily ;K ^ manner consistent wi th their testimony i n the 
Bodi I y DT ~>c>-ec ing; 
3 • 
mental Memorandum in support (1 :*? M -ion r disqualify, 
i r ^ n 7 r \ - p - it ' r--: •-)•- '"ir\ : i'" 
followed -^}.4-iemental Opposite ;. .w tn* Motion 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen; and finally IHC's Supplemental 
Repl ;; ; and 
A That the parties hereby submi t to the Court as 
Exhibit B hereto a copy of Judge Greene's Memorandum 
Deci sI c i l ai Id c i : d€ i: I i I Bodily v , xntermountain Health Care, 
et al." 
2 Tl lat the said Memorandum Decision a:\d -r.;er 
entered by Judge Greene on. November 2 5, 19 ^rtached 
hereto as Exhibit: "A" amid To whiih reference is hereby 
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made. 
Based upon the foregoing the Court concludes 
as follows: 
1. That the motion to disqualify should be denied 
on the ground that defendant is collaterally estopped to 
relitigate the same issue that was decided by Judge Greene 
in the case of Bodily v. IHC, Case No. C85-373G, United 
States District Court for the District of Utah. 
This Court is of the opinion that it should give 
full faith and credit to the Decision in Bodily since it 
is apparent that Judge Greene based his Decision on Utah 
law (particularly Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 p.2d 1195) 
as well as Federal law. That Judge Greene was fully 
cognizant of Utah law is demonstrated by his noting that 
the Utah Code of Professional Responsibility has been 
adopted by the Federal Court of Utah (Rule l[g] of its 
Local Rules of Practice) and the same was operative in 
his Court. It is also apparent that Judge Greene considered 
the Margulies case distinguishable upon its facts and that 
he exercised his discretion in determining that disqualifi-
cation should not be imposed. 
In analyzing the matter it is obvious that the 
issue presented to this Court under the pending motion is 
identical to the issue decided by Judge Greene in Bodily. 
- ! > -
It also seems apparent that there was a final 
judgment o™ the merits aodily e 
Greene specificallv stages. ':•• -ir.v event it hab betjn held 
ana c» Llateral * f K rights 
asserted I : nt- n«ai. action mav ^t .haract* 1 
without waiting for t *. > whole case t % decided Clearly 
in bodily ; : separable from 
and collateral * 4:ie .ssuei. *•. medical malpractice and 
pei'-una I in inn* y asserted by Bodily against IHC (see In re 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of tl: le Press, et a] , 773 
F.2d 1325' - order is final for purposes of collateral 
esliipi vcrsfMl uin Appeal, modified, or set aside 
in the court oi. renditioi i . (Berry v. Berry, 
Rep. 45) 
It I >i IIJII.IHH ,i{i{m 11. III I IIHII flh |.nl .Jeainst 
whom the plea of collateral estoppel is asserted in this 
ease flUf ) was a prirM to the Bodily case in the Federal 
District Court. 
There can be no question hut that the issue of 
cii.Mlu.jIil it -if inn in H< di ] y was completely, fully and fairly 
litigated as tl> lan/cripi ; .;._ . „^ t- :.*. . bodily 
and the decision * f Judge Greene clearly show. 
that the doctrine • i jl.ateral e:>t ppei . ., app.i.a: <e 
s 
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in this case. 
2. The Court, by reason of the foregoing, and 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) URCP hereby directs that the Order 
denying the Motion to Disqualify is a final Order and shall 
be entered as such and that there is no just reason for 
delay in the entry thereof as a final judgment. 
Dated this 13 ~ day of August 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
R 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT XfciERiC*** 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION 
NORMAN W. BODILY, 
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE Civil No. C85-373G 
CORPORATION, dba McKAY-DEE 
HOSPITAL CENTER, H. GARY PEHRSON 
and SHELDON D. WARD, M.D., 
Defendants. 
This matter came on for hearing on September 29, 1986, 
on defendant Intermountain Health Care Corporation's Motion to 
Disqualify. Defendant Intermountain Health Care was represented 
by Dan S. Bushnell and Charles W. Dahlguist II, and the law firm 
of Howard, Lewis & Peterson was represented by Glenn C. Hanni. 
Legal memoranda were submitted on behalf of all parties, 
testimony of witnesses was heard and exhibits were received into 
evidence. Counsel argued the Motion extensively after which the 
matter was taken under advisement. The court now being fully 
advised, sets forth its Memorandum Decision and Order. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The law firm of Howard, Lewis & Peterson (the "Howard 
firm"), which is located in Provo, Utah, has a well-established 
general litigation practice with particular emphasis upon medical 
malpractice and personal injury claims. On April 1, 1985, the 
plaintiff, Norman W. Bodily, by and through his attorneys., the 
Howard firm, filed a medical malpractice action in federal 
district court against Intermountain Health Care Corporation 
(f,IHCM). At the time the dispute herein arose, the Howard firm 
had six other lawsuits pending in various stages of discovery 
against IHC in various courts within this state* 
On July 11, 1985, Mr. Peter C. Rosenbloom of the Los 
Angeles, California law firm of Findlay, Kumble, Wagner, Hein, 
Underberg, Manley & Casey contacted Mr. Richard B. Johnson, a 
partner with the Howard firm, by telephone. Having selected the 
Howard firm from among listings in the Martindale Hubbell 
referral service, Mr. Rosenbloom briefly introduced himself and 
indicated that his firm had been retained by IHC to represent 
that entity in connection with a wrongful discharge action 
brought by Veta S. Wilson. Wilson, a former employee of the Utah 
Valley Regional Medical Center, a Provo, Utah facility owned and 
operated by IHC, had filed an action against IHC on June 14, 
1985, in Utah's Fourth Judicial District Court. In his 
conversation with Johnson, Rosenbloom indicated that his law firm 
needed a local firm to move for the admission of certain firm 
members to practice in the Wilson matter and also to conform 
documents to the local rules of practice. Johnson testified that 
during this initial telephone conversation he specifically 
informed Rosenbloom that the Howard firm had a number of 
malpractice cases pending against IHC, including the Bodily 
litigation. Johnson said he explained that the Howard firm's 
proposed representation of IHC presented a serious conflict of 
interest problem but that Rosenbloom said he did not see a 
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conflict, nor have any problem with the Howard firm's pending 
lawsuits against IHC in unrelated litigation. Nevertheless, 
according to Johnson, Rosenbloom stated that if there were any 
problems in discussing the matter with his superiors and the 
client, he would let Johnson know.1 Otherwise, Rosenbloom said 
that the file would be sent the next day with instructions for 
Johnson to appear as local counsel in the case in order to 
accomplish the purposes previously outlined.2 
The following day, Johnson received a confirmation 
letter from Rosenbloom by express mail dated July 11, 1985, 
requesting that Johnson file a motion for the admission, pro hac 
vice of Mr. Gary R. Overstreet, Mr. Michael W. Monk and Mr. Peter 
C. Rosenbloom for purposes of the Wilson litigation. The matter 
was set up on the billing and accounting records of the Howard 
firm under the name of Rosenbloom since Mr. Johnson considered 
that he was simply performing a minor professional courtesy as 
local counsel for out of state attorneys. Johnson did not 
1
 A disputed telephone log was produced for the first time by Mr. 
Johnson during the course of these proceedings. A notation 
thereupon relative to the crucial initial conversation between 
Johnson and Rosenbloom had the following entry: "Gary Overstreet 
• meeting with client - IHC conflict explained 1) Pro Hac 2) file 
motion to dismiss will send if client approves." 
2 Rosenbloom testified that during this conversation Johnson made 
no mention of the Howard firm's then existing adverse 
representation of Bodily, or of the Howard firm's various prior 
and pending lawsuits against IHC. He further testified that 
nothing was said about a possible conflict of interest. 
discuss the new representation with other members of the Howard 
firm, and no one otherwise discovered the Howard firmfs 
conflicting representation of IHC. 
On July 17, 1985, Johnson filed the appropriate motion, 
and an Order admitting the California attorneys was signed by 
Honorable George E. Ballif on August 1, 1985. Later in August, 
Johnson reviewed and edited a draft of motion to dismiss and 
memorandum in connection with the Wilson matter, and returned it 
to Rosenbloom who made additional corrections and returned it to 
Johnson. The motion and memorandum were filed with the Utah 
court on August 19, 1985. Subsequently, Johnson prepared a 
notice of deposition, which was to be held on September 27, 1985, 
although Johnson was never contemplated as the attorney who would 
take the scheduled deposition. On October 17, 1985, Rosenbloom 
sent Johnson a letter confirming a conversation several days 
earlier and enclosed a draft of their proposed reply brief in the 
frilson litigation. Johnson also edited this brief as to form and 
filed it with the court. On November 8, 1985, the state district 
court ruled upon an ex parte motion and order for leave to file 
an oversized memorandum and order, which motion had been prepared 
by Johnson. Mr. Johnson did no further work on the Wilson matter 
after this time and he submitted a bill to the California counsel 
for legal services and costs in the name of Rosenbloom for the 
amount of $195.82. 
According to Johnson's testimony, supported by other 
evidence,, no written documents of any kind were requested or 
received by Johnson from IHC. Johnson at no time discussed the 
Wilson case with IHC's counsel, management or other personnel. 
Johnson testified that the Howard firm did not receive from any 
source, nor was it privy to, any confidential or secret 
information of IHC* Although Johnson did not solicit or receive 
information of any kind in connection with the Wilson litigation 
which may have been used or construed as against the interests of 
IHC in other litigation, as counsel for IHC in the Wilson case he 
had access to such information and materials. 
Johnson testified that it was his understanding from 
the representations of IHC's designated California counsel that 
IHC had knowledge of the need for local counsel and was 
consenting to the Howard firm's representation in this matter. 
Nevertheless, Johnson did not memoralize his initial conversation 
with Rosenbloom concerning the disputed disclosure of the 
conflict by way of a follow-up letter to Rosenbloom or by other 
written communication. Johnson did not contact or inform IHC or 
its Salt Lake City counsel of the Howard firm's potentially 
conflicting representation. Further, Johnson did not contact any 
of the other clients of the Howard firm, including Bodily, which 
had pending lawsuits against IHC for the purpose of disclosing 
the potential conflict and obtaining their consent to the 
proposed dual representation. In November, IHC's inhouse and 
Salt Lake City counsel discovered that the Howard firm had been 
engaged by the California firm to represent IHC. Johnson was 
immediately contacted by telephone and told to perform no further 
service and that his employment in the matter was terminated. It 
is undisputed that in this telephone conversation Johnson 
11 
asserted that the California firm had "cleared" the 
representation insofar as conflict of interest matters are 
concerned. 
The movant in this action cannot be said to have 
brought this motion for purely tactical reasons, but there was 
evidence of a poor professional working relationship between 
counsel in the Bodily litigation. This "bad blood" between the 
attorneys may have been a partial motivation for the instant 
motion.3 Mr. Johnson withdrew as counsel in the Wilson matter on 
January 16f 1986. On March 6, 1986, IHC filed the instant Motion 
to Disqualify in the case before this court, alleging violations 
of Utah's Code of Professional Responsibility by the Howard firm. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
I. THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
The law governing lawyers consists of principles of 
substantive and procedural law as well as ethical rules. Certain 
requirements of lawyer conduct, such as mandates of competence,4 
3
 Charges of "unprofessionalism and a violation of the Canons of 
Ethics" were not only denied but responded to with charges of 
"generally bad" prior experience, resentment and an assertion of 
"pomposity." 
* Certain ethical mandates, such as lawyer competence, may 
reflect substantive law requirements such as the standard of care 
required of lawyers, but rules of ethics are said not to create 
the substantive law requirement. The Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct
 y adopted by the ABA in 1983 and presently pending before 
the Supreme Court of Utah with certain proposed modifications to 
replace the existing Code of Professional Conduct, set forth the 
scope and purport of ethical rules as the basis for disciplinary 
action but not necessarily civil liability: 
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of 
action nor should it create any presumption that a 
legal duty has been breached. The Rules are designed 
-* 
may emanate both from substantive law and ethical rules. Other 
requirements of lawyer conduct, such as certification of 
allegations in pleadings, may emanate from rules of court and 
rules of procedure as well as ethical rules. In some cases, 
courts have established rules of law from ethical rules.5 in the 
conduct of litigation, courts often apply rules of law and/or 
rules of ethics to preserve the integrity of the proceeding. 
There is no practical distinction in cases arising in many 
jurisdictions, including the United States District Court fcr the 
to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a 
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary 
agencies* They are not designed to be a basis for 
civil liability. 
Model Rules, p. 5. 
5 For instance, the canon of ethics which makes it improper for 
an attorney to communicate directly with a person or. the other 
side who is represented by counsel has been utilized to create a 
rule of law which would exclude otherwise voluntary statements 
obtained from an accused. In United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 
110 (10th Cir. 1973), the court was confronted with violation of 
an ethical canon in which the prosecuting attorney had obtained a 
statement from a criminal defendant without informing his 
attorney or giving him a reasonable opportunity to be present at 
the interview. The court observed that no constitutional 
principle was here involved, but said: 
What we do hold, however, is that once a criminal 
defendant has either retained an attorney or had an 
attorney appointed for him by the court, any statement 
obtained by interviev; from such defendant may net be 
offered in evidence for any purpose unless the 
accused's attorney was notified of the interview which 
produced the statement and was given a reasonable 
opportunity to be present. To hold otherwise, we 
think would be to overlook conduct which violated both 
the letter and the spirit of the canons of ethics. 
This is obviously not something which the defendant 
alone can waive. 
Id. at 112. 
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District of Utah, where the court in question has incorporated as 
a rule of court the Code of Professional Conduct or other ethical 
rules.6 
Violation of the law and rules governing the conduct cf 
lawyers in the context of litigation requires, among other 
things, an analysis of the nature of the violation and its impact 
upon the trial proceedings. The imposition of appropriate 
sanctions is properly left to the discretion of the trial court. 
II. VIOLATIONS OF THE CANONS OF ETHICS 
It is alleged that the Howard firm violated various 
Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Howard 
firm raises three basic defenses: (1) that under the facts of 
this case there is presented a situation of prior representation 
which would bring into play the doctrine of "substantial 
6
 Rule 1(g) of the Civil Rules of Practice of the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah states: 
The standards of conduct of the members of the bar of 
this court . . • in a particular case shall be those 
prescribed by the Utah Code of Professional 
Responsibility and amendments thereto and revisions 
thereof and by the Code of Professional Responsibility 
approved by the Judicial Conference of the United 
States. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in E.E.O.C. v. Orson H. Gygi 
Co., 749 F.2d 620, 621 n.1 (10th Cir. 1934), recognized that the 
above quoted rule of practice incorporates both the state and 
national codes of professional responsibility and makes both 
binding upon counsel before this court. See also City Consumer 
Services, Inc. v. Home, 571 F. Supp. 965, 969 (D. Utah 1983) 
("Utah's Revised Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted by 
this court in Rule 1(g) of the Local Rules of Practice, [is] 
binding on all members of the federal bar."); In re Roberts/ 46 
B.R. 815 (D. Utah 1985). Of course, the Utah Supreme Court's 
construction of Utah's version of the Code is relevant and 
persuasive. 
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relationship";7 (2) that adequate consent was obtained from IHC 
through its designated agents or representatives so as to permit 
simultaneous representation; and (3) that even assuming the 
existence of a conflict of interest, no prejudice or hardship is 
presented in this matter which would warrant the sanction of 
disqualification. 
IHC alleges in its Motion to Disqualify that the Howard 
firm committed violations of Canons 4, 5 and 9.® The court will 
address each claim separately: 
7
 Counsel for the Howard firm argued that since Johnson withdrew 
as counsel in the Wilson case in January, by the time the Motion 
to Disqualify was filed in March its only representation was in 
the Bodily case, and hence Wilson was a former client. It is 
clear, however, that the operative facts occurred when the Howard 
firm was representing Bodily against IHC and IHC against Wilson 
simultaneously. The court regards this matter as a case of 
simultaneous, not prior, representation. Counsel for the Howard 
firm cites Beck v. Board of Regents, 568 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Kan. 
1983) in support of its argument that Wilson should be regarded 
as a former client since that is how it was regarded in a 
somewhat similar situation in Beck, even though there had been 
simultaneous representation prior to the hearing on the motion 
for disqualification in that case. One major distinction as 
between that case and this case, however, is that in Beck the 
court found no violation of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility because of the simultaneous representation of 
"possibly or potentially adverse clients." The focus of the 
analysis in Beck was successive representation under Canon 4, but 
the court found no violation of Canon 5 "under the facts of this 
case." We have the reverse situation here. 
e
 While violations of other Canons of ethics were also asserted, 
including Canons 1 and 2, no evidence or substantial argument was 
urged at the hearing regarding those Canons. It is apparent that 
claimed violations of Canons 4, 5 and 9 are relied upon 
fundamentally as the basis for disqualification. 
<S 
A. CANON 4 
Canon 4 relates to situations in which an attorney 
represents an interest adverse to a client he has previously 
represented. In such situations, the applicable ethical rule 
provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly "use a confidence or 
secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third 
person, unless the client consents after a full disclosure.119 
This ethical canon imposes a presumption of disclosure of the 
confidences and secrets of a client and hence violation of the 
Canon where the matters at issue are comparatively similar and 
related. In determining that matter, courts have generally 
applied a "substantial relationship" test. Under that standard, 
an examination is undertaken of the nature, relationship, 
similarities and other relevant aspects of an attorney's prior 
and subsequent representation. Both the Tenth Circuit10 and the 
9 DR 4-101(B)(3). 
1 0
 In Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985), 
(emphasis added) the Tenth Circuit observed: 
The merits of this disqualification motion depend 
on whether a substantial relationship exists between 
the pending suit and the matter in which the 
challenged attorney previously represented the client. 
"Substantiality is present if the factual contexts of 
the two representations are similar or 
related." 
• • * 
Once a substantial relationship has been found, a 
presumption arises that a client has indeed revealed 
facts to the attorney that require his 
disqualification. The majority of circuits that have 
considered the issue have held this presumption to be 
irrebuttable. We agree. The presumption is intended 
to protect client confidentiality as well as to avoid 
ifi 
Utah Supreme Court11 have recognized the substantial relationship 
test under Canon 4 as applicable to cases of subsequent adverse 
representation of a former client. 
This court considers the claimed applicability of Canon 
4 to the situation presented at bar to be misplaced in that the 
instant case does not present the situation of "subsequent 
representation of a former client;" rather, this case involves 
"simultaneous representation of two existing clients/1 Likewise, 
the defense that no "substantial relationship" exists between the 
Wilson wrongful discharge suit and the Bodily malpractice action 
is similarly misplaced. In addressing a situation involving 
adverse representation of existing clients, the Tenth Circuit 
Court, noted: 
The propriety of [an attorney's] conduct is 
"measured not so much against the similarities 
in litigation, as against the duty of 
undivided loyalty which an attorney owes to 
each of his clients." 
any appearance of impropriety. 
See also In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659 
F.2d 1341, 1346 (5th Cir. 1981). 
11
 The Utah Supreme Court, in Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 
1195, 1202 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added) said: 
Canon 4fs prohibitions against disclosure of client 
confidences and secrets have generally been 
interpreted to forbid an attorney from representing a 
client against a former client in a matter 
substantially related to the former client1s 
representation. 
17 
E.E.O.C., 749 F.2d at 622 (quoting Cinerama 5, Ltd. v. Cineramaf 
Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976) ("The Substantial 
relationship1 test is . . • customarily applied in determining 
whether a lawyer may accept employment against a former client") 
(emphasis added). 
This court considers that the conduct of the Howard 
firm should be measured not so much in terms of similarities or 
dissimilarities between the Wilson and Bodily cases, but by the 
Howard firm's professional duty of undivided loyalty to its 
clients. Accordingly, the court will focus its attention upon 
alleged violation of Canon 5 rather than the substantial 
relationship test of Canon 4.1^ 
B. CANON 5 
1. General Rule 
Canon 5 and the disciplinary rules promulgated 
thereunder require an attorney to exercise independent 
professional judgment on behalf of his client and to 
decline proffered employment if the exercise 
of his independent professional judgment in 
behalf of a client will be or is likely to be 
adversely affected by the acceptance of the 
proffered employment. . . . 
^ if the substantial relationship analysis of Canon 4 wei* 
applicable in this case, it would appear that the labor d i ^ n -
presented in the wrongful discharge case of Wilson would not r-
substantially related to the medical malpractice litigation .tu 
this action. However, it is clear that the Canon 4 test is not 
applicable here because at the time the Howard firm undertook 
representation of IHC against Wilson the firm already represented 
Bodily against IHC. 
K 
DR 5-105(A)• Where an attorney represents two adverse clients 
simultaneously, as the Howard firm has admittedly done in this 
case, Canon 5 is clearly applicable and there is a per se 
violation of the Canon, absent the application of exceptions 
provided for in the Canon. Further, it becomes the burden of 
proof of the attorney who undertakes to represent adverse clients 
simultaneously to establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that there was no violation.13 
2. Exception 
DR 5-105(c) makes clear that concurrent representation 
of two adverse clients is permissible only under certain narrowly 
prescribed circumstances: 
[A] lawyer may represent multiple clients if 
it is obvious that he can adequately represent 
the interest of each and if each consents to 
the representation after full disclosure of 
the possible effect of such representation on 
the exercise of his independent professional 
judgment on behalf of each. (Emphasis added.) 
a. Obviousness 
The first requirement under DR 5-105(C) is that it 
be "obvious" to an attorney, in his independent professional 
judgment, that he would be able to represent both clients 
adequately. While the Code does not define the word "obvious," 
an objective standard should be applied, as noted in City 
Consumer, 571 F. Supp. at 971 (quoting Unified Sewerage Agency, 
646 F.2d 1339, 1348 n.12 (9th Cir. 1981)): 
1
 ^  It is well-established that the burden of proving compliance 
with the Code of Professional Responsibility is upon the party 
undertaking adverse representation of two clients. City 
Consumer, 571 F. Supp. at 570; Margulies, 696 P.2d at 1203. 
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(2> 
"[WJithout belaboring the point, we think 
•obvious1 must refer to an objective standard 
under which the ability of the attorney 
adequately to represent each client is frea 
from substantial doubt/1 I am persuaded that 
the applicable objective standard, in this 
case, for defining "obvious" is whether the 
lawyer possesses substantial doubt that he can 
adequately represent the interest of each 
client. 
Regarding the issue of obviousness, Johnson 
admitted that he immediately detected an obvious conflict of 
interest in taking on representation of IHC in the Wilson 
litigation while suing IHC in Bodily and other malpractice 
actions* According to his testimony, Johnson told Rosenbloom at 
the time of their initial telephone conversation, and he so 
testified as to his present perception at the hearing, that 
without the consent of IHC there could be no representation by 
the Howard firm of IHC in the Wilson litigation. The alleged 
failure of California counsel to recognize or be concerned about 
the conflict was and is irrelevant. The point is that the 
conflict should have been obvious to anyone in the Howard firm, 
and in fact the conflict was obvious to Mr. Johnson, absent 
informed client consent. Accordingly, the court focuses on the 
matter of consent. 
b. Informed Consent 
The second requirement of DR 5-105(C) is that the 
attorney obtain "consent" to the dual representation after "full 
disclosure" of the possible effects of such representation. The 
Supreme Court of Utah has ruled, and we agree, that: 
For client consent to be adequate in a 
conflict of interest situation, the attorney 
must not only inform both parties that he is 
undertaking to represent them, but must also 
explain the nature and implications of the 
conflict in enough detail so that the parties 
can understand why independent counsel may be 
desirable. 
Maroulies, 696 P.2d at 1203-04; see also City Consumer 571 F. 
Supp. at 971 (informed consent required). 
Counsel for the Howard firm argued that Johnson 
reasonably could imply that he had obtained the requisite 
•'consent1' because Johnson, in good faith, "fully disclosed" the 
Howard firm's prior existing relationship with IHC to Rosenbloom, 
the legal representative and agent of IHC, and there was never 
any suggestion of a problem or conflict.14 There is no dispute 
that Johnson at no time personally contacted any of IHC's BJ^L 
personnel, management or local counsel about a possible conflict;y^-
Further, no attorney from the Howard firm spoke with Mr. Bodily ZtT 
or any of the other plaintiffs in the Howard firm s other pending — 
litigation against IHC about the potential conflict of interest 
1 4
 Johnson testified that he believed and expected that 
Rosenbloom would advise the client and discuss the matter fully 
with his superiors as a precondition to mailing the file or 
requesting any work to be commenced by Johnson. It is urged on 
behalf of the Howard firm that the nature of its involvement was 
of very limited scope and that the so-called "rowing oar" was to 
be manned almost entirely by California counsel. The following 
factors were urged as bearing upon Johnson's stated belief that 
the required consent had been obtained or that he didn't need to 
pursue the matter: the limited scope of Johnson's intended 
representation; Johnson's involvement in procedural as opposed to 
substantive aspects of the litigation; the California firm's 
direct employment of the local counsel; Johnson's services and 
transmission of billing reports directly to the designated 
California counsel; Johnson's reliance upon California counsel's 
alleged representations concerning disclosure to and consent of 
the client; the motives of the California and local counsel with 
regard to their respective involvement; and the lack of actual 
disclosures made to Johnson. 
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before the Wilson case was taken on. No memorandum or letter was 
drafted by Johnson to Rosenbloom confirming the legal 
representation arrangement and clarifying the delicate issue of 
IHCfs consent to the Howard firm's proposed dual representation. 
According to his own testimony, Johnson solely relied upon 
representations of an out-of-state attorney, whom he had never 
met nor dealt with before. 
Even under the most favorable light of the facts 
as related by Mr. Johnson, he failed to obtain the requisite 
"consent after full disclosure" as mandated by Canon 5. Mr. 
Johnson's conduct constituted blind faith reliance upon another 
and was well below the minimum standards prescribed by the 
applicable Canon of ethics. Even absent Johnson's knowledge and 
experience in this sensitive area of the law,15 his efforts and 
conduct in obtaining the requisite consent were hardly adequate. 
Under ethical standards applicable to all attorneys, there was 
neither full nor reasonable disclosure in this case as to either 
of the clients involved. While reliance on a fellow attorney's 
» » I.,, 
representations may often result in the complete disclosure 
desired and in the receipt of necessary client consent, an 
attorney so relying does so at his own peril. Here Mr. Johnson's 
1 5
 Johnson is an experienced litigator, with particular 
experience with the Code of Ethics, having vigorously moved for 
disqualifications prior to this action on several occasions. It 
would have been or should have been obvious to any attorney that 
suing an entity in far reaching litigation might and probably 
would be inconsistent with representing that entity even as to 
substantially different matters. The necessity of obtaining 
informed consent from both clients likewise should have been 
obvious to any practicing attorney. A fortiori as to Mr. 
Johnson. 
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reliance on Rosenbloom was misplaced and unreasonable under the 
circumstances. It is not contested that Johnsonfs conduct is 
imputable to the Howard firm. 
This court finds that the Howard firm failed to 
prove by a .preponderance of the evidence that there was no 
violation of the ethical standards imposed by Canon 5 of the Code 
of Professional Responsibilty. Regardless of the question of 
burden of proof, however, and even under the version of facts 
most favorable to the Howard firm, it is manifest that Canon 5 of 
the Code was violated* t^± 
C. CANON 9 
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 
provides that MA lawyer should avoid even the appearance of 
professional impropriety." This Canon appears to be so all 
inclusive and indefinite as to constitute a non-standard, but in 
certain cases courts have found violations of this Cancn.16 This 
1
^ The Supreme Court of Utah in Margulies, stated: 
The basis of this tenet is that society's perception 
of the integrity of our legal system may be as 
important as the reality, since it is the perception 
that engenders public confidence that justice will be 
dispensed. Litigants are highly unlikely to be able 
to maintain this confidence if their attorney in one 
matter is allowed simultaneously to sue them in 
another. 
696 P.2d at 1204. The court pointed out that two important 
policy considerations must always be balanced carefully by any 
court ruling on a Motion to disqualify in this situation: the 
undesirability of separating litigants from the counsel of their 
choice and the public's perception of attorneys and the courts as 
possessing the integrity necessary for the disposition of 
justice. See Margulies, 696 P.2d at 1204. Similarly, the 
Supreme Court of Utah said In re Hansen. 586 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 
1976) (emphasis added): 
9.9 
standard is difficult to apply because it requires the court to 
speculate as to who the observers of relevant appearances are, 
and it is vague.17 One court determined that the standard is 
"too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order, 
except in the rarest of cases."18 Another court rejected it 
because it constitutes an f,eye of the beholder" test.19 Like 
pornography, however, the courts and other lawyers "know it when 
they see it." There may be substance to it in a proper case, but 
the combination of doubt as to the viability of the standard, 
plus lack of egregiousness under the facts of this case, leads 
this court to stop short of finding a violation of Canon 9. 
The practice of law is a profession whose members are 
granted a special privilege of holding themselves out 
as having the education, the skills and the integrity 
to give help and guidance to others in their affairs. 
• . . This includes that the attorney will become 
unreservedly identified with his client's interests 
and protect his rights. It means not only in dealing 
with the client's adversary, but also that the 
attorney will adhere to the ideals of honesty and 
fidelity with the client himself; and that he will not 
use his position to take any unfair advantage of the 
special confidence which the client is entitled to 
repose in him. 
1 7
 These matters are discussed and authorities collected in C. 
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 7.1.4 (1986). 
1 8
 Board of Education v. Nyguist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
1 9
 Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir, 
1977), cert, denied 436 U.S. 905 (1978). 
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III. SANCTION OF DISQUALIFICATION 
The Tenth Circuit has long-recognized that "the control 
of attorneys1 conduct in trial litigation is within the 
supervisory powers of the trial judge, and his performance in 
this area is a matter of judicial discretion." Redd v. Shell Oil 
Co.. 518 F.2d 311, 314 (10th Cir. 1975); Waters v. Western Co. of 
North America, 436 F.2d 1072, 1073 (10th Cir. 1971)). In City 
Consumer the court stated: 
To disqualify a party fs chos-en attorney is a 
serious matter. "Where an attorneyfs conflict 
of interest undermines the court's confidence 
in the vigor of his representation of the 
client, the court may disqualify the 
attorney.11 
571 F.2d at 970 (citations omitted). Regarding a district 
court's broad discretion, the Tenth Circuit has ruled that a 
court's disposition of a disqualification motion will be reversed 
"only if the court has abused its discretion." E.E.O.C., 749 
F.2d at 621. 
The Second Circuit has identified two circumstances in 
which disqualification will be ordered: 
(1) where an attorney's conflict of interests 
in violation of Canons 5 and 9 of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility undermines the 
court's confidence in the vigor of the 
attorney's representation of his client, . . . 
or more commonly (2) where the attorney is at 
least potentially in a position to use 
privileged information concerning the other 
side through prior representation, for 
example, in violation of Canons 4 and 9, thus 
giving his present client an unfair advantage. 
iM%> 
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444 (2d Cir. 1980); (quoting 
Board of Education v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d at 1246). Under the 
Second Circuit view, the fact that the conduct in question has 
been found to constitute a violation of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility does not require disqualification of counsel as a 
matter of course. In Matter of Bohack Corp., 607 F.2d 258, 263 
(2d Cir. 1979), it was noted that 
courts have indicated great reluctance to 
"separate a client from his chosen attorney 
where the alleged misconduct does not 
prejudice an opposing party and taint the 
litigation in which he is appearing." 
More recently, in Bottaro v. Hatton Assoc, 680 F.2d 895, 896-97 
(2d Cir. 1982), the court adopted "a restrained approach,11 
which calls for disqualification only upon a 
finding that the presence of a particular 
counsel will taint the trial by affecting his 
or her presentation of a case. Board of 
Education v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d 
Cir. 1979); McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 444-446. We 
have conceded that this test will not "correct 
all possible ethical conflicts," McAlpin, 625 
F.2d at 445, but have also noted that this 
laudable goal cannot be attained through 
rulings in the course of litigation without 
inviting the wholesale filing of motions for 
tactical reasons. The result would be 
needless disruption and delay of litigation, 
thereby impairing the efficient administration 
of justice. See id. at 438, 446. Where a 
threat of tainting the trial does not exist, 
therefore, the litigation should proceed, the 
remedy for unethical conduct lying in the 
disciplinary machinery of the state and 
federal bar. Id. 
The sanction of disqualification of counsel in 
litigation situations should be measured by the facts of each 
particular case as they bear upon the impact of counsel's conduct 
upon the trial. The egregiousness of the violation, the presence 
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or absence of prejudice to the other side,20 and whether and to 
what extent there has been a diminution of effectiveness of 
counsel are important considerations. In addition, equitable 
considerations such as the hardship to the other side and the 
stage of trial proceedings are relevant. The essential issue to 
be determined in the context of litigation is whether the alleged 
misconduct taints the lawsuit* For instance, in Beck v. Board of 
Regents of State of Kan,, 568 F. Supp. 1107 (D.C. Kan. 1963) the 
court withheld its "inherent power" to disqualify stating that: 
The court should not act unless "the offending 
attorney's conduct threatens to 'taint the 
underlying trial1 with a serious ethical 
violation." Field v. Freedman, 527 F. Supp. 
935, 940 (D. Kan. 1981). Whether or not the 
underlying trial may become tainted must be 
addressed in each case based on its own 
specific facts. 
Id. at 1110. See also Meat Price Investigators Assoc, v. Iowa 
Beef Processors, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Iowa 1977), aff'd, 
572 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1978). 
In the case at bar, the conduct of the Howard firm does 
not so undermine the court's confidence in the firm's vigor and 
ability to fairly represent Bodily as to warrant 
disqualification. This case does not present a situation of one 
client gaining an unfair advantage over another by means of an 
attorney's unethical wrongdoing. The small amount of time spen 
*° Improper communications and disobeyed court rules were found 
as sufficient cause for disqualification of counsel in Kleiner v. 
First Nat'l Bank, 102 F.R.D. 754 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd in part 
rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985) (reversed for lack 
of due process hearing on disqualification). But cf. Ceramco, 
Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1975), wherein 
the court held that an attorney need not be disqualified where 
the imDrooer communication does not Dreiudice the other oartv. Oh> 
and the very modest fee charged demonstrate that there was 
certainly no incentive for great reward on the part of counsel• 
In this case# there was no attempted or actual solicitation or 
receipt by the Howard firm of any confidential information of any 
kind. Although not sufficient to excuse the attorney's personal 
duty under Canon 5 to obtain informed consent after full 
disclosure, the fact that Johnson dealt with and relied upon a 
co-attorney rather than a lay person is significant as a 
mitigating factor.21 There has been absolutely no prejudice to 
IHC in this case, and there would be no prejudice to the ultimate 
disposition of this case on the merits should the Howard firm be 
permitted to continue its representation of Bodily. Moreover, 
disqualification of the Howard firm at this juncture would 
substantially delay these proceedings and doubtless would work an 
undue hardship not only on the plaintiff Bodily, but upon 
plaintiffs in the other cases pending. 
After weighing all of the facts and circumstances of 
this case, this court concludes that disqualification is not 
merited in this instance. 
This Memorandum Decision and Order is in all respects 
final and counsel need neither prepare nor submit additional 
memoranda or orders for the court's consideration. 
^
1
 In Margulies, the court emphasized that the law firm's 
"reliance on a lay person" to pass on crucial conflict of 
interest information without requiring "adequate assurances that 
he had done so properly11 was "simply not sufficient to meet the 
standard of professional conduct." While not a controlling 
distinction in this case, Johnson's reliance upon a co-attorney 
similarly to convey such critical information does mitigate in 
favor of the Howard firm. 696 P.2d at 1203-04. 
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Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc. 
[If 63,311] Frank L. Hawkins, in behalf of himself and all others similarly situated 
v. Holiday Inns, Inc. 
U. S. District Court, Western District of Tennessee, Western Division. No. C-72-217. 
Filed March 6, 1980. 
Sherman Act 
Private Suits—Pretrial Procedures—Disqualification of Attorneys—Effect of Prior 
Decision—Bar on Communication.—The doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar a court 
from disqualifying a law firm from representing members of an antitrust class action. 
An assertedly conflicting, prior adjudication of the issue by another court could not 
preclude an independent, subsequent determination of the issue. Moreover, the firm 
was properly barred from communicating with any of the class members in view of a 
finding of impropriety on the part of the firm. A contention that the bar violated the 
firm's constitutional rights was rejected. See fl 9190.18. 
Denying new trial of 1980-1 Trade Cases ff 63,150. 
Order Denying Motion for New Trial 
MCRAE, D. J.: In this complex class anti-
trust litigation Holiday Inns, Inc. moved to 
disqualify the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, 
Fierman, Hays & Handler and the members 
thereof from —«--»• ^ »..*:-^ r «ome o* fV»<* clar* 
members in this case. After extensive hear-
ings, this Court, on December 7, 1979, 
granted the disqualification motion and 
ordered prohibitions against communication 
between the law firm and the class members 
whom they claim to represent [1980-1 TRADE 
CASES J 63,150]. 
Kaye, Scholer has filed a Motion for a 
New Trial pursuant to Rule 59 FRCP, 
which seeks as its primary relief granting 
a new trial and denying the disqualification 
motion of Holiday Inns, Inc. In the alterna-
tive the motion seeks to have the non-com-
munication paragraph of the Court's order 
deleted. 
The bases advanced by Kaye, Scholer for 
this motion are (1) that this Court is col-
laterally estopped from disqualifying Kaye, 
Scholer because of the ruling of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana which on October 29, 
1979, refused to disqualify the firm from 
representing the plaintiffs in Domed Stadium 
Hotel v. Holiday Inns, Inc., Number C-78-
4115 [1979-2 TRADE CASES fl 62,993], and (2) 
that the paragraph of this Court's order 
prohibiting communication between Kaye, 
Scholer and its clients impermissibly inter-
feres with the right of freedom of speech of 
Kaye, Scholer, particularly its members, Mr. 
Handler and Ms. Head. 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not 
deprive this Court of the power to deter-
mine the disqualification motion. 
Kaye, Scholer asserts that the decision in 
Domed Stadium v. Holiday Inns, Inc., supra, 
denying a motion (made by Holiday Inns) 
to disqualify them precludes this Court from 
granting the disqualification motion in the 
present case. Kaye, Scholer relies upon the 
Supreme Court's application of offensive 
collateral estoppel in Parklane Hosiery Co. 
v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322 (1979). *? AO point 
in that opinion does the Court address the 
application of collateral estoppel to a court 
No authority has been cited, nor has this 
Court discovered any authority which would 
apply collateral estoppel against a court so 
as to preclude the court from determining 
a matter before it. This Court must reject 
the idea that it is bound by a determination 
of a District Court in another jurisdiction in 
a case that is only obliquely related to the 
case before this Court. 
The Supreme Court in Parklane discusses 
the policy and rationale underlying the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel. The first con-
sideration is whether a party who has had 
issues of fact determined adversely to it in 
an equitable proceeding may relitigate the 
same issues before a jury. This considera-
tion has no application to the present 
controversy. The second factor is the pro-
motion of judicial economy. There is no 
saving in judicial time or effort in this case 
because the matter has been heard and de-
termined. A third consideration is the pro-
tection of litigants from the burden of 
relitigating an identical issue with the same 
party or his privy. This consideration also 
is not found in the present case. The Su-
preme Court posed the "broader question 
. . . whether it is . . . tenable to afford 
a litigant more than one full and fair op-
portunity for judicial resolution of the same 
issue." Parklane, supra at 328. In the cir-
cumstances of a motion to disqualify coun-
sel, the broader question has a different 
significance; i. e., regulation of the con-
duct of the attorneys in the particular 
1 63.311 © 1980, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
440 6-2-80 Cited 1980-2 Trade Cases 7 5 , 6 1 9 
Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc. 
case before the Court See First Wiscon-
sin Mortgage Co. v. First Wisconsin Corp., 
584 F. 2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978). This 
Court has the power and the duty to reg-
ulate the conduct of members of its bar. 
IBM v. Levin [1978-1 TRADE CASES 1162,114], 
579 F. 2d 271, 283 (3rd Cir. 1978). This 
Court has the obligation to preserve public 
confidence in the propriety of the conduct 
of those associated with the administration 
of justice. Id. In the present case this Court 
has found that Kaye, Scholer violated both 
Canons 4 and 9 of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. There was a finding not 
only of an appearance of impropriety, but 
actual improper conduct on the part of 
Kaye, Scholer. Under these circumstances, 
not only is the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel inapplicable; this Court would be remiss 
in failing to disqualify Kaye, Scholer. 
Further, it is a matter of mere fortuity 
that the issuance of the ruling on the mo-
tion ii Domed Stadium ^receded ...^ . «li.»b 
of this Court1 It should be noted that the 
Hawkins case has been pending since 1972, 
long before the Domed Stadium case was 
filed. Kaye, Scholer knew of the Hawkins 
case, and was aware of the pendency of the 
disqualification motion in it at the time the 
disqualification motion was filed in Domed 
Stadium. Under these circumstances, had 
Kaye, Scholer thought the doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel applicable, it should have 
moved for a stay of the proceedings on the 
motion in Domed Stadium. This would have 
had the effect of relieving Kay, Scholer of 
the burden of litigating this issue twice. 
Kaye, Scholer, however, did not choose to 
do this. Instead, it chose to take two bites 
at the apple, and did not raise collateral 
estoppel until its Motion, for New Trial in 
this cause. If Kaye, Scholer had chosen 
to assert its collateral estoppel theory at 
at the time it delivered a copy of the Domed 
Stadium ruling to this Court, Holiday Inns 
would have had an opportunity to appeal 
the Domed Stadium, ruling.* It would be 
manifestly unfair to apply collateral estop-
1
 The motion in Hawkins was filed on August 
18, 1978. The Domed Stadium case was not 
filed until December of 1978. 
* It is possible to appeal an order of dis-
qualification In the Sixth Circuit. General 
Electric Co. v. The Valeron Corp., 608 F. 2d 
265 (6th Cir. 1979). An order denying dis-
qualification, however, is not appealable in the 
Sixth Circuit, although the Court understands 
the law of the Fifth Circuit is to the contrary. 
See Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co. 
[1979-1 TRADE CASES U 62,433], 592 F. 2d 290 
(6th Cir. 1979) and cases cited therein. 
* As the disqualification ruling indicates, Kaye, 
Scholer actually considers its client to be the 
Trade Regulation Reports 
pel against Holiday Inns now. See Berner 
v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, 346 
F. 2d 532, 540 (2nd Cir. 1965) cert, denied 
382 U . S . 983 (1966). 
The order prohibiting communication between 
Kaye, Scholer and any of the plaintiffs 
in this cause is warranted by the 
finding of impropriety on the 
part of Kaye, Scholer 
Kaye, Scholer asserts that the order of 
this Court prohibiting" communication be-
tween it and some of the class members as 
their alleged clients, impermissibly inter-
feres with their freedom of speech. At this 
juncture the Court notes that the Code of 
Professional Responsibility applies to Kaye, 
Scholer. There are certain demands made 
upon attorneys which may in fact interfere 
with unfettered speech, such as the duty to 
preserve a client's confidences. 
In IBM v. Levin, supra at 281, the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the finding of the Dis-
trict Court that the disqualified law firm 
"never acquired any confidential informa-
tion. . . ." Because of that finding, the order 
to turn over work product to the successor 
lawyers could not prejudice the party seek-
ing the disqualification. That situation is 
not present here, as this Court specifically 
found that Kaye, Scholer inquired into 
broad phases of the operations of Holiday 
Inns, Inc., thus acquiring confidential 
information. 
In its reply memorandum filed January 8, 
1980, Kaye, Scholer for the first time re-
quests a stay of the non-communication 
order pending appeal as an alternative to its 
original alternative ground for relief in the 
Motion for New Trial, a modification which 
would allow it to discuss with its clients 
the desirability of taking an appeal from 
the ruling of this Court. Initially, this 
Court questions the need of Kaye, Scholer 
to discuss an appeal of this ruling with its 
alleged clients.* Kaye, Scholer is the dis-
qualified party, not the clients. Also, this 
International Association of Holiday Inns. This 
Association is composed of all Holiday Inn 
franchise holders and the franchisor. Kaye, 
Scholer now claims to represent a portion of 
the class members who did not opt out. These 
are called the non-Hawkins class members. 
Their interests in this case are not the same 
in this lawsuit as the Interest of the officers 
of the Association. Furthermore, as this Court 
noted in its ruling, the non-Hawkins class 
members are ably represented by attorneys in 
the Arm of Heiskeil, Donelson, Adams, Williams 
& Kirsch of Memphis, Tennessee, which attor-
neys are the attorneys of record for the non-
Hawkins class members. 
Tl 63.311 
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Court has found violations of Canons 4 and 
9. The actual impropriety of Kaye, Scholer's 
conduct mandates that a stay of this ruling 
not be granted. It is the opinion of this 
Court that the restraint imposed on Kaye, 
Scholer by this Court's previous order is 
necessary to effectuate the disqualification 
order, and that such restraint can have no 
effect on Kaye, Scholer's ability to appeal 
this ruling. Furthermore, a stay will fur-
Opinion 
TRASK, Cir. J.: Equifax appeals from a 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) order 
finding that Equifax violated section 7 of 
the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C §18/ by 
acquiring three credit bureaus in 1970 and 
1971, thereby lessening competition in the 
"local credit reporting" service market. 
The complaint in this action charged the 
Retail Credit Company, now known as 
Equifax, Inc. (Equifax), with violating sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U. S. C. § 18) 
and section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act (15 U. S. C. §45),* by reason 
of its acquisitions of Credit Bureaus Inc., 
Salem, Oregon (CB West Coast) in Janu-
ary 1970, of the Credit Bureau, Inc., Wash-
• Honorable Wilson Cowen, Senior Judge, 
United States Court of Claims, sitting by desig-
nation. 115 U. S. C. § 18 provides In pertinent part: 
"No corporation engaged In commerce shall 
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any 
part of the stock or other share capital and no 
corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the 
whole or any part of the assets of another cor-
poration engaged also In commerce, where In 4any line of commerce in any section of the 
country, the effect of such acquisition may be 
H 63,312 
ther delay the pursuit of the lawsuit by the 
plaintiff, Hawkins, and the class members 
he represents. 
It is the decision of this Court that the 
previous ruling is correct on the facts and 
the law, and that the motion for a new 
trial is without merit and is denied in its 
entirety. 
It is so ordered. 
ington, D. C. (CBDC) in October 1970, and 
of the credit reporting assets of the Retail 
Credit Association of Portland, Oregon, Inc. 
(CB Portland) in January 1971. The com-
plaint charged that these acquisitions would 
have the probable effect of substantially les-
sening competition in the "credit reporting" 
product market, and various product sub-
markets both in the United States as a 
whole and in several sections of the country, 
including Washington, D. C; the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area; Portland, Oregon; Tacoma, 
Washington; and other metropolitan areas 
in the Pacific Northwest. We must affirm 
the FTC's findings if they are supported by 
substantial evidence. 15 U. S. C. § 45(c); 
Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC [1978-1 TRADE 
CASES fl 62,087], 577 F. 2d 1368, 1378 (9th 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend 
to create a monopoly/' 
* 15 U. S. C. 5 45 provides In pertinent part: 
"(a) Declaration of unlawfulness; power to 
prohibit. (1) Unfair methods of competition in 
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are 
hereby declared unlawful. * • • 
"(6) The Commission Is hereby empowered 
and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, 
or corporations . . . from using unfair methods, 
of competition in or affecting commerce.'' 
© 1980, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
[fl 63,312] Equifax, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission. 
U. S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. No. 78-3089. Filed April 30, 1980. Petition to 
Review a Decision of the Federal Trade Commission. 
Clayton and FTC Acts 
Acquisitions—Relevant Product Market—Credit Reports and Mortgage Reports— 
Cross-Elasticity of Supply.—Mortgage reports and credit reports were not shown to be in 
the same product market for purposes of assessing the competitive effects of an acquisition 
under Sec 7 of the Clayton Act or Sec. 5 of the FTC Act. Although cross-elasticity of 
supply ca.. L- .. .did basis fur pK**«ig two commodities in the same market, it did not 
appear that production of such reports involved similar techniques or technology or that 
producers of such reports had produced both types. See fl 4290.68. 
Vacating and remanding FTC cease and desist order, Dkt. 8920. 
For petitioner: J. Wallace Adair, Francis A. O'Brien, and Albert O. Cornelison, of 
Howrey & Simon, Washington, D. C, Kent E. Mast, Atlanta, Ga. For respondent: 
Mark W. Haase, Washington, D. C. 
Before: COWEN,* Senior Judge, TRASK and Hue, Circuit Judges. 
